Improving the mastery of human factors in a safety critical ATM organisation by Teperi, Anna-Maria


Improving the mastery  
of human factors in a safety critical  
ATM organisation


Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of 
the Faculty of Behavioural Sciences at the University of Helsinki 
in Auditorium XII, Main Building, Unioninkatu 34, Helsinki, 
on the 7th of June 2012, at 12 o’clock.
Supervisors: 
Professor Anneli Leppänen
Finnish Institute of Occupational Health 
Work Organizations
Finland 
Research Professor Leena Norros
Technical Research Centre of Finland
Automation and Human-Technology Interaction
Finland 
reviewers:
Dr Christine Owen 
Faculty of Education
University of Tasmania
Project Leader: Organising for Effective Incident Management
Bushfire CRC 
Australia
Professor Matti Vartiainen
Aalto University School of Science
Work Psychology and Leadership
Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
Finland
Opponent:
Professor Pascale Carayon
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
University of Wisconsin-Madison
USA
ISBN (pbk.) 978-952-10-8008-1 
ISBN (pdf ) 978-952-10-8009-8
http://www.ethesis.helsinki.fi
Layout and cover: Tarja Petrell, Studio Gemma
Cover photo: Pietari Vanhala
Publisher: Author
Yliopistopaino Unigrafia, Helsinki 2012
Contents
Abstract  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
Tiivistelmä  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
List of original publications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
Figures used in this thesis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
1 Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
1.1 The context – the historical development of aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Air traffic management as a system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.1 Global and European ATM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.2 Finnish Civil Aviation Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2.3 Finnish ATM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3 HF within the ATM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3.1 Definition of and research related to HF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3.2 HF in ATM – guidelines and earlier research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4 Learning at work and in an organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.1 Learning a new way of thinking and a method supporting it . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4.2 Value of a new way of thought and a tool (HF) for implementing it . . . . 31
1.4.3 Organisational features that affect learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4.4 Environmental factors affecting learning in an organisation . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5 Approaches adopted in studies of complex sociotechnical systems . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6 Summary of the theoretical background of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Applying HF in the target ATM organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 Aims of the study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 Materials and methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 Intervention material (development plans) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Open questions (in two questionnaires). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Safety culture questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.6 HF tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.7 Summary of the participants and methods of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.8 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.9 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 empirical studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1 From crisis to development – analysis of air traffic control  
 work processes (Study I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 Managers’ conceptions regarding human factors in air traffic management  
 and in airport operations (Study II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3 Learning in air navigation services after initial training (Study III) . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Application of a new HF tool in an air traffic management  
 organisation (Study IV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5 General discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1 Development phases of the target ATM organisation regarding  
 the mastery of HF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.2 Factors supporting HF application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.3 Factors that hindered the HF application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4 HF as a necessary tool for the target ATM organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.5 Evaluation of the HF application and this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.6 How to proceed in the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

8Tiivistelmä
Inhimillisten tekijöiden (Human Factors, HF) hallinta turvallisuuskriittisissä järjestel-
missä, kuten lennonvarmistuksessa ja lennonjohdossa on välttämätöntä, jotta varmiste-
taan toiminnan sujuvuus, turvallisuus ja hyvinvointi. Lennonjohdon tehtävä on ehkäistä 
lentokoneiden yhteentörmäykset ja huolehtia lentoliikenteen sujumisesta turvallisella 
ja taloudellisella tavalla. Lennonjohtotyö sisältää monimutkaisuutta, epävarmuutta ja 
muuttuvuutta, jotka lisäävät inhimillisten virheiden riskiä. Inhimillisten tekijöiden tie-
teenala soveltaa käyttäytymistieteellistä osaamista järjestelmien toiminnassa. Tässä väi-
töskirjassa inhimillisten tekijöiden tietämystä käytetään lennonvarmistuksen työn, työn 
hallinnan ja turvallisuuden kehittämisen työkaluna. 
 Väitöskirja koostuu neljästä osatutkimuksesta, jotka kuvaavat inhimillisten tekijöi-
den soveltamista lennonvarmistusorganisaatiossa 10 vuoden aikana. Väitöskirjassa tar-
kastellaan sovellusprosessia heikentäviä ja tukevia tekijöitä, ja arvioidaan, miten uuden-
lainen ajattelu- ja toimintatapa omaksutaan organisaatiossa. 
 Tutkimuksissa havaittiin, että lennonvarmistusorganisaatio edustaa teknis-autoritaa-
rista ympäristöä, joka hallitsee infrastruktuurin kehittämisen ja jonka toimintaa vahvasti 
ohjaa kansainvälinen normisto. Ihmisen toimintaa koskevaa osaamista on lennonvarmis-
tuksessa sovellettu heikosti (Tutkimus I). Organisaation esimiesten haastattelut toivat 
esille, että inhimillisten tekijöiden tietämyksen hyödyntämiselle organisaatiossa ei ollut 
olemassa yhtenäistä strategiaa (Tutkimus II). Organisaation oppimisjärjestelmässä oli 
puutteita, mm. poikkeamien tietoja ei analysoitu systemaattisesti toiminnan tai turval-
lisuuden kehittämiseksi (Tutkimus III). Operatiiviseen toimintaan liittyviä inhimillisiä 
riskejä ja onnistumisia opittiin kuitenkin analysoimaan työn arkeen suunnitellulla työ-
kalulla (Tutkimus IV).
 Tutkimusten tulokset osoittavat, että kulttuuriset ja rakenteelliset esteet, kuten ha-
janainen ja vanhakantainen ilmailuhallinnon historia hidastivat inhimillisten tekijöiden 
osaamisen juurruttamista. Aihealueen hyväksymistä organisaatiossa kuitenkin edistivät 
toimintaympäristön muutostarpeet, joihin käyttäytymistieteellisten työkalujen ja lähes-
tymistapojen ajateltiin tarjoavan uusia ratkaisumalleja. Lennonvarmistusorganisaation 
kannattaa jatkaa inhimillisten tekijöiden tietämyksen hyödyntämistä, kuitenkin tunnis-
taen sen soveltamista heikentävät ja tukevat tekijät. Tulokset voivat tukea vastaavaa työtä 
myös muissa turvallisuuskriittisissä organisaatioissa.
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e thesis begins with a presentation of ATM as a part of the aviation system, and Finnish 
ATM (including its historical phases) as the context of the studies on which this thesis is 
based. e theoretical background is then presented, including, at rst, the denition and 
development phases of the eld known as HF and the relevance of HF as a key safety factor 
in ATM systems. Frameworks of learning at work and in organisations are used, and their 
value as implications in this thesis is pondered. e implementation of HF as a new way of 
thinking and acting (as an innovation) in the target ATM organisation is then presented. 
en, a few essential frameworks concerning the safety critical and sociotechnical nature of 
ATM are presented. e overall theoretical background of this thesis is summarised with a 
gure. e background is followed by the specic aims of the studies (I–IV) and the methods 
used in the thesis. ereafter, each study is introduced and discussed. Finally the results are 
set in the more general context of the theoretical background of this thesis, and the factors 
that encouraged and hindered the mastery of HF are evaluated. Practices for improving HF 
mastery in the target ATM organisation (as well as in other safety critical domains) in the 
future are considered.
1.1 The context – the historical development of aviation
e role of HF in aviation has its roots in the earliest days of aviation. Already the rst ights 
in the beginning of the 1900s indicated the paradox of aviation safety: the purpose of aviation 
was an adventure and discovery, but the ights had to be restricted in order to maintain safety 
(e.g. departure and destination locations had to be carefully selected). Instrumentation emerged 
for aircrafts during World War I and further improved in World War II (Koonce, 1999). e 
essence of the ergonomics was recognised especially by British aviation in its attempts to improve 
the ergonomics of the cockpits in military aircraft (Murrell, 1976). 
 Aviation is still expanding. More people need or want to y, the number and types of 
aircrafts are increasing, and technical innovations are constantly being introduced in the 
control of aircrafts and in the human roles and jobs in aviation. In addition, the domain 
of HF as a discipline is expanding, producing new applications and topics to be employed 
(Garland, Wise & Hopkin, 1999).
1.2 Air trac management as a system
Air navigation services (ANS) are provided for air trac during all phases of operations. 
ANS include the following six categories of facilities and services: communication, navigation 
and surveillance services, meteorological services for air navigation, aeronautical information 
services, search and rescue, and ATM (ICAO, 2009). 
 ATM is dened as the dynamic, integrated management of air trac and airspace – safely, 
economically and eciently – in collaboration with all parties (ICAO, 2005). Its components 
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 In 1931, Finland acceded to the Paris Convention with respect to international aviation, 
and the government was able to participate in the planning of international transport. 
In Finland, the building of airports needed both state guidance and funds. In 1937, an 
“assistant junior secretary for aviation” (under the Ministry of Transport and Public Works) 
was appointed the task of acting as the country’s proper aviation authority, responsible for 
all matters related to air safety (e.g. observing international ight regulations and granting 
operational licences). Ministry-appointed part-time inspectors, most of whom were engineers 
from the Armed Forces, carried out these activities. 
 In 1943, an administrative unit called the Aviation Oce was formed within the Ministry 
of Transport and Public Works. Earlier, the possibility of combining the air company Aero 
O/Y and the national civil aviation administration into a single private company had also 
been studied, but then cancelled3. Air trac growth in the 1950s centred around domestic 
ights, and in the 1960s the international arena became important. In 1963, the co-
ordination between airspace use and air surveillance with the Air Force was claried. 
 By the 1960s, the fragmented nature of aviation administration was attracting increasing 
attention from politicians and within the industry itself. It was even reported that the approach 
of the aviation administration was unnecessarily slow and complicated in individual cases. is 
was probably the rst time that organisational factors were raised and were of interest from 
the functional point of view. In 1972, a civil aviation board and an authority subordinate to 
it were established, and the National Board of Civil Aviation (NBA) began work. ree of its 
administrative functions were airport maintenance and ANS (by the Airports Department), 
air safety (by the Flight Safety Department) and general management (by the Administrative 
Department) (Hakola, 1997). ese same functions can be found in the organisation structure 
even today (Finavia, 2010; see also Figure 3).
 e rst signals of outer pressures and a need for change were seen in 1980’s and 1990’s. 
By 1987, air trac congestion was putting international political pressure on aviation 
ocials. e ANS Department was set up, which was comprised of ATC, communications, 
navigation and other ANS facilities (see Figure 1). By 1990, reform was needed to create 
business models for state-owned rms, and, in 1991, a new state enterprise, the Civil 
Aviation Administration (CAA), began operating. e privatisation meant increased 
nancial independence and the responsibility for the new organisation. Rapid reforms, 
such as modernisation and rebuilding, were started, especially regarding terminals, and the 
focus was on satisfying customer requirements. e Flight Safety Authority was established 
to carry out ocial civil aviation duties. It was independent of CAA’s business operations, 
even though it was still a part of CAA. 
 In the 2000s, rapid changes occurred in the outer functional environment of the whole 
organisation. Finland joined the European Union in 1995, and a more open ow of people 
and products became possible. e aviation markets also became more open because of 
3  is kind of solution for organising aviation administration was made in the USSR in 
1923.
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1.3 HF within the ATM 
1.3.1 Denition of and research related to HF 
According to the International Ergonomics Association (Wilson, 2000), HF (or synonymously 
ergonomics, sometimes also abbreviated as HFE) is the scientic discipline concerned with 
understanding interactions among humans and other elements of a system. e profession, 
human factors engineering, applies theory, principles, data, and other methods to design 
in order to optimise human well being and overall system performance. e Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) in the United Kingdom (UK) has dened HF as the environmental, 
organisational and job factors combined with the human and individual characteristics that 
inuence behaviour at work in a way that can aect health and safety (HSE, 1999). 
 Within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States (US), HF is 
dened as a multidisciplinary eort to generate and compile information about human 
capabilities and limitations, as well as to apply that information to equipment, systems, 
facilities, procedures, jobs, environments, training, stang, and personnel management for 
safe, comfortable, and eective human performance (FAA, 2005). 
 A core principle of HF is systems thinking: HF professionals consider the network of 
interactions between individuals and various elements of their environment (or work 
system) (Wilson, 2000). e knowledge required to design, implement and disseminate HF 
is diverse. It relies on knowledge of basic scientic disciplines, such as physiology, sociology 
and psychology, as well as on knowledge of such applied sciences as industrial engineering, 
business and management (Carayon, 2010).
 Several approaches and phases (or ages) of the analysis of HF and safety have been 
identied (Hale & Hovden, 1998; Sheridan, 2008; Reiman & Oedewald, 2009). However, 
they are not so clear and straightforward, as some views that have been hailed as modern 
have been around for some time in aviation (e.g. Wiener, 1977; 1980). e rst age of 
the scientic study of safety (from the 19th century to World War II) concerned technical 
measures and represented traditional error/risk analysis. e person was usually considered 
the weakest component of the safety system (Heinrich et al., 1980). During this period, 
personnel training and selection were developed as preventive measures. 
 e second age of safety (from World War II to the 1970s) focused more on human 
error and human recovery, for example, as according to Rasmussen (1982). e limits of 
technical risk assessment and preventive measures were realised in the 1980s.
 e third age of safety (in the 1990s) focused on safety management systems and 
organisational factor research, as well as on their development, with more pro-active aspects. 
e model of human error and organisational accidents developed by James Reason became 
widely accepted. is classication of unsafe acts distinguished between active and latent 
failures, the eects of which may lie dormant until triggered later by other mitigating factors. 
Dierent layers of the system infrastructure (defences or safeguards) ensure system safety and 
prevent the eects of failures (Reason, 1990; 1997). e Reason model has been criticised for 
making complex reality too linear and for remaining too abstract (Hollnagel, 2004).
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 Several ATC accident investigations concerning individual controllers have highlighted 
such individual limitations as attention slips and errors in judgement as causes of accidents 
(Danaher, 1980; Billings & Reynard, 1984). is approach is nowadays considered too 
simplistic for the analysis of work in complex sociotechnical systems (e.g. Dekker, 2002; 
2007), but it still sometimes emerges. For example, the nal accident report on the air crash 
in which the Polish president was killed (Final Report, 2011) placed most of the blame 
for the accident on the pilots. Focusing on individual features creates the risk of stating 
criminal responsibility in such cases (Dekker, 2007).
 Another concept that has been used to explain controller performance (usually 
limitations) is vigilance (the ability of an observer to maintain attention over long, 
uninterrupted periods). e ability to detect critical signals drops rapidly, inducing a slowing 
of reaction time or an increase in error rate during task monitoring (e.g. Tattersall, 1998). In 
addition, the eects of fatigue on operators’ performance (e.g. lowered attention, higher risk 
taking, increased error rate) have been a concern (Costa, 1995; Tattersall, 1998), as has their 
contribution to ATC-related aviation mishaps (NTSB, 2007). Stress may arise in ATCOs 
due to a feeling of a loss of control, fear related to the consequences of errors, relations with 
supervisors and colleagues or other incidents (e.g. Costa, 1995; Tattersall, 1998; Vogt et al., 
2002). Means for coping with stress, for instance, in cases of critical incidents in ATC (Vogt 
et al., 2002; Leonhardt & Vogt, 2006), have been conceived and recommended.
 In order to analyse operator performance in ATC cases, some useful terms have been 
introduced and used in academic studies or investigations. e concept of the situational 
awareness of the operator has been used, meaning the person’s perception of the elements in 
the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and 
the projection of their status in the near future (Endsley, 1995; Endsley & Smolensky, 1998, 
130). It has also been recognised that, in order to cope with work demands, ATCOs need 
an accurate mental model, an internal presentation of the system that they are dealing with 
(Norman, 1986; Schorrock & Isaac, 2010), so that they can predict, explain and understand 
the environment and interaction around it. For ATCOs, a specic mental model may be 
situation specic (e.g. a certain type of trac) or it may represent the entire task domain (e.g. 
the entire ight sector or operating guidelines) (Garland et al., 1999, 263; 479).
 From the aspect of work characteristics (e.g. type of equipment, workload), especially 
the increasing level of automation in ATC has been actively studied by several researchers 
(e.g. Tattersall, 1998; Kirwan, 2001a, b; Metzger & Parasuraman, 2003; 2005). ese 
researchers have reported that automation in ATC is necessary because of the need for more 
ecient trac ow or the need to compensate for human vulnerabilities (e.g. the move 
towards free ight and pilot-mediated ATC), but questions arise about the adequate risks 
related to human control over automated systems, mistrust of automation and complacency 
or underload. e eects of automation on ATC were especially studied in the United 
States in the late 1990s (e.g. Wickens, Mavor & McGee, 1997), but the topic is still current 
today because of the future visions of ATC automation and systems that still raise concerns 
about facilitating human centred automation (e.g. Kirwan, 2001a, b; 2002; Vogt et al, 
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 Organisational structures, conicts and cultures have been found to constrain 
opportunities for learning and improving the ways of acting in ATC (Owen, 1999; 2009) 
and other complex systems (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Weick & Sutclie, 2003). 
Participative planning (Wilson & Russell, 2003) and a positive organisational climate have 
supported change management in ATC (Arvidsson, Johansson et al., 2006), and it has 
been concluded that organisational features play a more signicant role than individual 
dierences or peer relations in how ATCOs interact with their environment or ATC 
systems (Chang & Yeh, 2010). Concerns have been raised regarding the fact that, while 
safety levels improve, organisations make decisions in which safety records are further 
optimised, usually due to economic goals (Ek, Akselsson et al., 2007; Johnson & Kilner, 
2010 concerning ATC; Amalberti, 2001; Perrow, 2007 concerning several high reliability 
domains). 
 ATC is one part of the aviation system (ICAO, 2001; 2005; Hollnagel, 2003) (see 
also Figure 1), which is comprised of several components. Co-operation between dierent 
organisations is needed to assure success in one of the ATC basic demands, that of managing 
a complex mixture of air trac from commercial, general, corporate, and military aviation 
(Wickens et al., 1997). Currently, the vast majority of ATM risks are caused by general 
aviation, non-commercial pleasure ights that infringe on controlled airspace, mainly due 
to navigation failure and non-adherence to the use procedures established for the involved 
airspace (Eurocontrol, 2007). is situation indicates that, from the systemic learning point 
of view, challenges still exist with respect to improving ATC. For several years already, the 
system viewpoint has been recognised as a necessary aspect of organisational development 
studies (e.g. Hakkarainen et al., 2003; Engeström, 2004).
1.4 Learning at work and in an organisation 
e basic aim of this thesis is to describe how the ATM organisation learned to master HF 
and how the mastery of HF improved in 10 years. Mastery is dened as comprehensive 
knowledge of, or skill in, a subject, but also as the process or action of mastering a subject 
(Senge, 1990; Webster’s dictionary, 1996). 
 Currently work-related knowledge, organisational learning and knowledge management 
are regarded as prerequisites for organisational success (Leppänen, Hopsu et al., 2008). 
Organisations are becoming more knowledge intensive, and there are new ways in which 
work organisation and information technology are changing work (Boland & Tenkasi, 
1995; Boreham, 2002). ese are also the features that the ATM embodies internationally 
(Owen, 1999; Metzger & Parasuraman 2005; Murray, 2009) in Europe (Eurocontrol, 
2002; 2004) and in Finland nowadays (Koskela & Palukka, 2010). e pressure to adapt in 
the transformations in worklife and to successfully realise planned organisational changes 
(e.g. Hendry, 1996; Robbins, 1996) requires that organisations become more aware of the 
issues of knowledge and learning. 
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 A conscious analysis of work is necessary to meet the complex, dynamic and uncertain 
situations that exist in risk prone environments, such as ATM (e.g. Roske-Hofstrand & 
Murphy, 1998; Kirwan et al, 2001; Vogt et al., 2002). Analytical orientation is a key factor 
also in the handling of normal operations (Norros, 2004; Eurocontrol, 2007; Norros & 
Nuutinen, 2009). Reection on disturbances is not always possible (Rogalski et al., 2002) 
because of the workload, communication breakdowns or other vulnerabilities found in ATM 
(Wickens, 1999; Durso & Manning, 2008; Chang & Yeh, 2010). Work is often done in 
shifts, and only a few professionals have the opportunity to learn from experience in a new 
or rare situation. Contextual and cultural vulnerability was also recognised in ATM, when 
Owen (1999; 2009) found that, in ATC on-the-job training, some workplace instructors 
actively rejected principles typically associated with adult learning. erefore, interventions 
to enhance the creation of work process knowledge are needed (Leppänen, 2001). At the 
same time, perceiving the facts, or determining how such action can be put into practice in 
safety critical organizations, must be evaluated. ere have, however, been relatively few such 
interventions and evaluations.
 ere have also been only a few studies carried out on the processes or outcomes of 
development that have been led by an internal facilitator or coach, although the process of 
adopting habits of acting that support learning and participation in work development is 
only starting in organisations (Leppänen et al., 2008). To the best knowledge of the author 
of this thesis, no long-term studies have thus far been carried out on the application of HF in 
ATM organisations from the viewpoint of the adoption of new thinking, while the scientic 
focus has been on the cognitive work demands of the individual operator (e.g. Batteau, 
2002; Koskela & Palukka, 2010), and the descriptions of HF applications in ATM have 
concerned more short-term HF interventions with single HF issues, for example, training in 
ATC (Oprins et al, 2006; Murray, 2009). 
1.4.1 Learning a new way of thinking and a method supporting it 
Aviation has often been among the rst industries to apply new technologies, and, thus, also 
among the rst to encounter and resolve the HF issues associated with them (Garland et al. 
1999). In any case, in Finnish aviation, HF issues had not been raised proactively, even though 
professional discussion and research concerning HF was proceeding at the international level 
(e.g. Wiener, 1977, 1980; ICAO 1989, 1993). In this way, implementing HF in Finnish ATM 
can be dened as an innovation in which a novel set of behaviours, routines and ways of working 
are directed towards improving, for example, production outcomes or the user’s experience and 
which is implemented by planned and coordinated actions (Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane 
et al., 2004). What then helps the organisation to apply and implement a new way of thinking 
(HF) and acting (HF tools)? And what hinders this process? 
 In ergonomics, several researchers have pondered the challenges to be met when putting 
new methods or tools into practice (Broberg, 1997; Kirwan, 2000; Kerr, Knott et al, 2008; 
Zink, Steimle & Schroeder, 2008). Findings for HF programmes or applications in ATM are 
few or lacking. 
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HF researchers to identify signicant research issues, and HF educators need to understand the 
needs of HF professionals and researchers in order to develop eective training and educational 
programmes. HF experts should also be knowledgeable about the HF innovation itself, as well 
as being knowledgeable about the process used to implement the innovation, in order to be an 
eective change agent. In particular, communication with top management should be coached 
by HF experts (Carayon, 2010; also Robbins, 1996).
 Carayon (2010) has recommended, for instance, that HF researchers develop and test 
simple, reliable and valid HF tools and methods, and also develop models and theories about 
mechanisms between work system characteristics and other HF variables and safety. HF 
students should also be taught to be change agents in organisations. e dissemination of HF 
in organisations could rely on a network of HF-trained operators who are spread throughout 
the organisation and available to work on specic projects (Robbins, 1996; Carayon, 2010). In 
a “train-the-trainer” model, HF experts transfer their knowledge and expertise to a small group 
of selected employees. Over time, this group of employees gains HF knowledge and experience, 
and the role of the HF experts becomes a supporting one (Carayon, 2010).
1.4.3 Organisational features that aect learning
In general, in organisations, the following four types of barriers to the creation of safety systems 
have been identied: strategic barriers (e.g. unclear responsibility for safety across organisations), 
cultural barriers (e.g. autonomy of professional groups that may hinder eective teamwork), 
structural barriers (e.g. improvement at the department or unit level versus improvement at the 
system level) and technical barriers (e.g. a lack of evidence about what works) (Carayon, 2010; 
also Leveson, 2011). 
 Strong leadership, strategic vision and a climate conducive to experimentation and risk 
are characteristics of organisations that are receptive to change (Senge, 1990; Greenhalgh et 
al., 2004). e implementation of HF innovations can be particularly challenging, however, if 
organisations tend to have strong professional boundaries and professionals tend to function 
within mono-disciplinary communities (Carayon, 2010) 
 An organisation is ready for HF innovations if there is tension for change and HF is 
considered a promising solution to current problems. If there is pressure on an organisation to 
improve quality and safety, it creates an environment more receptive to change. Nevertheless, 
information needs to be provided to leaders and top managers so that they understand the 
(potential) benets of HF in improving the safety culture (e.g. Flin, 2006); case studies and 
actual examples of safety projects could provide support in informing these benets (Carayon, 
2010).
 Organisational readiness for innovation is also inuenced by whether the impact of the HF 
eort has been assessed and is anticipated, whether there is support and advocacy for HF within 
the organisation, whether dedicated time and resources can be allocated to the HF eort, and 
whether there is a capacity, and a system in place, for evaluating the actual and anticipated 
eects of the HF eort. All of this activity requires signicant preparation and planning to 
ensure that the organisation is ready for the HF (Kirwan, 2000; Carayon, 2010).

34
included a proposal on how skills, knowledge and collaborative resources can be used to cope with 
work demands. According to earlier study ndings, there are several factors that cause complexity 
in ATC systems, for instance, the number of interactions within the system or the combinations 
of trac volume and trac mix (Roske-Hofstrand & Murphy, 1998; Kirwan et al., 2001; Vogt 
et al., 2002; Hilburn & Flynn, 2005). e dynamicity of ATC is exposed in the state of the ATC 
system, which changes both autonomously and as a consequence of manipulation (Vogt et al., 
2002; Manning & Stein, 2005; Cox et al., 2007). Uncertainty in ATC refers to, for example, 
multiple, ill-dened goals (e.g. eciency and safety) that are in conict (Ek et al., 2007; Atak & 
Kingma, 2011). 
 In addition to the sociotechnical approach, that of cognitive engineering is relevant, 
and it helps to understand the problem area of this thesis. e research approach of cognitive 
engineering aims at improving complex, sociotechnical systems such as work environments. It is 
an interdisciplinary approach to the development of principles, methods, tools and techniques 
that can be used to guide the design of computerised systems intended to support human 
performance (Roth, Patterson & Mumaw, 2001). 
 e goal of cognitive engineering is to develop systems that are easy to learn and use and that 
result in improved human–computer system performance. Poor use or a poor introduction of 
(new) technology can result in systems that are dicult to learn or use, can create an additional 
workload for system users, or, in the extreme, can result in systems that are more likely to lead to 
catastrophic errors. us work in complex safety critical domains should be modelled, designed 
or evaluated from the viewpoint of HF (Vicente, 1999; Roth et al., 2001), including also the 
joint cognitive and co-operative demands at the system level (meaning also clients and regulators), 
which should be evaluated and enhanced (Hollnagel, 2003).
 
1.6 Summary of the theoretical background of this thesis 
is section presents the theoretical framework of this thesis, summarising various approaches 
and conceptions that have been used to identify the phenomenon of this thesis (improving the 
mastery of HF in a safety critical ATM organisation). e summary is illustrated in Figure 5, 
which has dierent elements. At rst, the key premises, assumptions and elements underlying 
the theoretical framework of this thesis are described. e relationships of the various elements 
of the theoretical framework to each other are then discussed. Here, ideas of a framework by 
Crossan, Lane and White (1999) are referred to.  
 Before the mastery of HF can be realised, the conception and denition of the eld known 
as HF must be claried (see Section 1.3.1). ATM as a sociotechnical system (see Section 1.2.), 
as well as the reality of the target ATM organisation (e.g. the need to improve HF mastery, 
described in Study I, II) as the object of interventions/improvements, must be evaluated – 
including its history and other contextual factors, for which the sociocultural approach was 
used. In order to improve the mastery of HF in the target ATM organisation, conceptions and 
frameworks of learning at work and organisational learning were considered useful. A few other 
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1.7 Applying HF in the target ATM organisation 
Before 2000, there was no systematic application of HF in the organisation under study, 
but several actions had been taken. In 1985, the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health 
studied ATC job characteristics. e resulting review (by Johansson & Kalimo, 1985) made 
some recommendations for improvements in the work of ATCOs.
 In the 1990s, a few severe ATC incidents called attention to the need to use external HF 
experts in investigations (AIB, 1993; 1994; 1997; 1999). In these investigations, core demands 
of the work, the risk proneness of work practices, unit management and work atmosphere in 
ATC were analysed. e reports stated, for example, that “there are deciencies in the working 
practices particularly with regard to commitment to norms and common practices” (AIB, 
1997, 46). In addition, dierences were found in the views regarding unit management, and it 
was recommended that these be analysed and cleared up in open discussions because “internal 
management should create a co-operative and positive atmosphere that could facilitate carrying 
out the core tasks of ATC.” (AIB, 1997, 53–54). On the basis of a thorough analysis of 
work practices (by AIB, 1993), the FCAA commented on the usefulness of considering that 
experts in behavioural sciences and work psychology also be used in forthcoming incident/
accident commissions in order to maximise the value and objectivity with respect to the 
background factors of such incidents (AIB, 1993, commentary of FCAA on 2nd May 1997). 
e international audit by the UK civil aviation authority in 1998 revealed that, although the 
operation was safe and international standards were being met, there were problems with such 
organisational issues as leadership and the management system (ANS audit Finland, 1998).
 Active trade union politics in the 1970’s through the 1990’s created a negative public 
image of ATCOs (Hanski, 2002). is negative image helped produce a need to study the 
construction of ATCOs’ professional identity and the legitimisation of the profession’s status 
in the labour market. is study was conducted by Palukka (2003), who started the research 
as an internal researcher, using group interviews and the cultural studies perspective. 
 A long-term HF application was started in the target ATM organisation of this study 
after the ATCOs’ strike in 1999, when a high-level ANS group (composed of external 
and internal experts of the FCAA) made several proposals for improving the ANS work 
environment (Final Report, 1999). One result was the hiring of an HRD expert with a work 
and organisational psychologist background in 2000 (see Figure 5).
 In 2003, the position of HF expert was formed in the safety and quality unit of the 
target ATM organisation. e former HRD expert continued in the role of HF expert. In 
the organisation, the reporting culture was becoming more open, and much incident data 
were available. It was also noted that causal factors behind the incidents were often related 
to human aspects (e.g. co-operation or communication problems) (Teperi, 2003). e HF 
expert started several activities, in particular HF training for ATC personnel. HF was also 
included in the reporting and investigation of ATC incidents, conducted by the safety and 
quality unit. ese activities were described in the manual for the safety management system 
of the target ATM/whole organisation. In addition, an internal network of HF trainers (from 
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e participating groups had varying roles at airports and in the ATM organisation: 
airport managers are responsible for airport activities in general, such as nance and 
community relations. e ATC managers were foremen of ATC units and were responsible 
for operational activities. ey also participated in operative routines and worked in shifts, 
and also dealt with administrative work as well. e ATC personnel/ATCOs worked in 
operative duties (monitoring the movements of the aircrafts) and reported occurrences 
and incidents that took place during the operations (see also the airport organisation 
chart, Figure 4).
3.2  Interviews 
Interviews were used in Studies I, II and III. In Study I, at the beginning of the intervention 
(in 2000-2001), dierent partners in (n=13) and out (n=3) of the ATM organisation were 
interviewed in order to determine the project goals. Interviews were also made after the 
intervention in 2005 (n=7, members of the ATM organisation). In Study II, ATC chiefs 
(n=12) and airport managers (n=9) were interviewed to determine their conceptions 
of HF. [ere was no possibility to interview the chiefs or other participants in airport 
operations, but the airport managers were asked for their opinions of the theme, as they 
had thorough knowledge of the area.] In Study III in 2006, ATC chiefs (n=11) and 
airport managers (n=9) were interviewed to determine their conceptions of learning in 
ATC work. 
 In Studies II and III, interviews were conducted because of the need to determine 
the supervisors’ conceptions of HF while the area was new in the organisation. e semi-
structured interviews originally included 34 items, of which 12 had been used in Study 
II, and 4 items were selected as material for Study III. Similar themes had been used by 
researchers who had studied the prerequisites for a learning organisation in the Finnish 
paper industry in the 1990s (Leppänen et al., 1997). e questions had been shown to be 
valid then for the assessment of learning in dierent functional environments and were 
also considered suited for the scope of Study III. 
 e interviews took an average of 1 to 2 hours and were recorded. 
3.3 Intervention material (development plans)
e intervention was evaluated in Study I. During the intervention (in 2000–2003), 
process groups in four ATC units (A–D) made plans regarding the most important 
development needs of their ATC work. e development plans were based on work 
process analysis models, which were the products of the intervention, but not used as 
research data of this study but instead served as background material for the development 
plans. A work analysis previously used in complex industrial processes (Leppänen, 
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 In Study IV, the ATC operators’ user experiences and the development needs of the 
HF tool and its use were studied using two open questions (“What experiences have you 
had with using the HF tool?” and “How would you improve the HF tool or its use?”) in 
2008 and 2009. ese questions were included in the questionnaires lled out annually to 
complete the safety actions in each unit and were to be answered by the safety and quality 
groups of each ATC unit (only ATC managers were members of these groups). e users’ 
experiences with the HF tool were elicited in 2008, and development needs were asked 
about in 2009. In both 2008 and 2009, 23 units responded to the questionnaires. Some 
units either did not complete their report on safety actions, or no data were available. 
In 2008, 17 units commented on the use of the HF tool, and, in 2009, all 23 units 
commented on it. In the open question data, some units had made brief comments (few 
words), and the more active units provided between one and two pages of text on their 
experience with the use of the HF tool. 
3.5 Safety culture questionnaire 
In Study III, selected items of the safety culture questionnaire were used. e survey was 
conducted in the organisation in 2008. e safety management system (SMS) had been 
started in the organisation at the beginning of 2006. e aim was to evaluate the workers’ 
own responsibility and attitudes towards safety. e basis of the questionnaire was a safety 
culture questionnaire that was formulated by Eurocontrol with the help of the University 
of Aberdeen and has been used by several air navigation service providers around Europe 
(Eurocontrol/Mearns and Gordon, n.d.). Most of the questions were reformulated by the 
HF expert of the organisation (the author of the study) in co-ordination with a consultant 
who implemented the questionnaire. e reformulation of the questions was based on the 
knowledge collected over several years of HF training sessions, audits in the organisation 
and interviews concerning HF (interviews used in Study II). Local circumstances and the 
work culture were focused on. 
 e questionnaire originally consisted of 38 questions, and 11 of them were chosen for 
this study to assess themes of reporting and learning (such as “I can bring up my mistakes 
and errors). e items were rated with values from 1 to 7 (1= totally agree, 2 = somewhat 
agree, 3 = slightly agree, 4 = slightly disagree, 5 = somewhat disagree, 6 = totally disagree, 
7 = do not know). ere were originally 212 respondents from various professional groups 
from airports and units. Altogether 142 participants were chosen for this study. ey 
were groups of ATC/AFIS personnel (n=102) and ATC/AFIS chiefs and airport managers 
(n=40) (no separate data from ATC chiefs and airport managers; instead they formed a 
common group).
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e tool was based on literature on factors that aect safety. e bibliographic analysis 
of 1682 HF scientic papers in the Human Factors journal in 1970–2000 by Lee, Cassano-
Pinche & Vicente (2005) also showed that the most frequently cited HF papers concern 
individual factors (e.g. the workload of the operator), work characteristics (e.g. skills training, 
displays supporting task performance) and group factors (e.g. interactive communication). 
Although organisational factors were not so frequently cited in the studies, they have more 
recently been the subject of active research and discussion (e.g. Dekker, 2002; Hollnagel et 
al., 2006; Perrow, 2007; Reason, 2008). 
 Each of the four parts of the HF tool consisted of items to be assessed, a total of 47 
(see Figure 7). e items in Part I describe individual ATC operators’ actions and their 
psychological states or characteristics, such as situational awareness (Endsley, 1995; Yang, 
Rantanen & Zhang, 2010), or stress (Costa, 1995) as sources of HF risks or strengths. e 
items in Part II describe work characteristics, for example, technology and systems (Norman, 
1986; Johnson et al., 2009). Part III includes items describing group and team factors, for 
instance, communication among team members or the correction of misunderstandings 
(Weick, 1993; Salas et al., 2001). Items in Part IV refer to organisational factors, such as 
safety culture (Weick & Sutclie, 2003; Ek et al., 2007; Atak & Kingma, 2010). 
 e items of the HF tool try to describe the factors that can either facilitate or hinder 
ATC operators’ work. us they are used to refer to the causal factors that contribute to 
incidents in both a positive (maintaining safety) and a negative (risking safety) manner. 
Including both positive and negative inuences means recognising human behaviour 
variability, which includes both the strengths and the risks of the ATM system (Hollnagel 
et al., 2006). Some of the items in the HF tool were (positive or negative) causal factors, 
some were contributing factors, and others were contextual conditions. ese were not 
conceptually separated in the design phase of the tool, nor during the application of the 
tool. 
 Training was given in the use of the HF tool before its implementation, and instructions 
on its use were included in the SMS manual of the organisation and placed on the intranet of 
the ATM organisation. e procedure for using the HF tool was as follows: ATC operators 
(managers, personnel) were asked to evaluate each incident report (that were sent to the 
reporting system) by marking the critical/suitable items of the case according to the HF 
tool. Not all of the 47 items were responded to; instead only the ones concerning critical 
causal factors of the incident at hand were chosen. Both the positive (maintaining safety) 
and negative (risking safety) causal factors were marked according to the HF tool. 
 In the study, a total of 3163 ATC incident4 reports were assessed with the HF tool in 
27 ATC units during 2008–2010. e ATC managers assessed 2716 of them, and ATC 
personnel were responsible for 447. Altogether 8782 HF-related positive and negative causal 
4 e conception of an incident as one form of risk: A hierachical variety of conceptions, risks, 
occurrences, incidents, accidents, catastrophies/crises can be used to describe the level of 
severity, the costs and the eects to people and material (e.g. Amalberti & Wioland, 1997).

48
3.8 Validity
 
reats to the internal validity of this thesis are addressed as follows because some conditions 
could lead to the wrong conclusions or results (Shannon et al., 1999).
 is research arose from the practical needs of an organisation that was starting to 
implement HF. A qualitative method was chosen to gain deep insight into the meanings and 
purposes attached to HF by the managers and learning at work and to provide contextual 
information for these conceptions (Guba & Lincoln, 2007). Applying descriptive, 
qualitative approaches such as phenomenography (in Studies II, III) to analyse the data 
suited the study of a new topic in order to reveal aspects of the study participants and also 
problem areas for future studies (Vicente, 1997). 
 e categories of descriptions or types of conceptions (used in the nal stages of the 
qualitative data analysis in Studies II, III, IV) were based on a relatively small amount 
of information and small numbers of study participants, and, naturally, there were no 
possibilities to calculate strict signicant dierences across the study groups – this was not 
even the purpose of the qualitative analysis. In Study II, categories of descriptions were used 
to determine the development phases of the managers’ conceptions regarding HF. It must 
be remembered that these kinds of categories are not so clear and linear in real life, but still 
help to conceptualise results.
 In addition, for some of the interview questions, there were few answers (Study II). is 
situation may reveal the diculty of conceptualising the participants’ own actions although 
there could be tacit knowledge concerning the area. It could also indicate that the interview 
questions were too general and not precise enough. Besides, the study topic was new in the 
organisation at the time of the data collection, and, naturally, the participants did not have 
the same conceptions as the researcher. e airport environment has very concrete jobs, and 
scientic language and concepts are unfamiliar there.
 In the qualitative study, detailed tables helped the researcher to give some structure 
to the mass of data. e tables also give the reader the possibility to assess the validity 
and reliability of the nal results when the raw data and the phases of the analysis can be 
concretely seen (Silverman, 2010). In this study, however, the phases of the data analysis 
were described (in Studies II, III), but they could not all be included to the original articles, 
or in this thesis, because of the limited space or the willingness to keep the text compact.
 e choice of co-authors5 from outside the organisation was important to assure that 
bias did not become a problem during the analysis of the data.
 
5  e co-authors of the articles (Studies I-IV) did not participate in the interventions or data 
collection during the studies, but did participate in the writing process after the data analysis. 
e co-authors were not working in the organisation but, instead, represented independent 
scientic research institutes.
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Six categories were used that were not created a priori but instead were determined on the basis 
of the data. e six categories were 1) co-operation, information ow, mutual understanding; 
2) machines, systems, technical support; 3) training; 4) work, procedures, other tools; 5) 
policies, future organisation; 6) ergonomics.
 ree to four years after the start of the project, structured interviews (n=7) were carried 
out (in 2005) to obtain information about the reminders and actions, and to determine the 
participants’ opinions of the usefulness of the intervention. ose interviewed were ATC chiefs 
of the four ATC units (A, B, C and D), leading group members, and an ANS high level group 
member. Before coming to the follow-up interview, the ATC chiefs were asked to talk to their 
process group members about their recollections of the project. [All but one did this.] Only 
some of the original interviewees were invited to the follow-up interviews. In previous studies, it 
has been found that interviewing a supervisor (as a key person and representative) of the group 
produces reciprocal information for the whole group (Teperi et al., 1998). ere was also the 
practical problem of calling back all of the participants several years after the project.
4.1.2 Results 
ere was wide agreement about the ocial project goal (which was the necessity to develop 
and analyse the ANS work environment) set by the ANS high level group at the beginning of 
the intervention. In addition, the following unocial goals of the project were recognised: the 
ATC Association strived for reorganisation in which ATCOs would not be part of the airport 
organisation but would instead join the ANS department. reats to the project were raised by 
all of the study groups except the stakeholders. Fear was mentioned about the possibility that the 
project would not being taken seriously, that the project would not result in permanent change 
and that only talk and paper work would start rather than actions. e external members did not 
talk about threats to the project, but they recognised the strong tensions between the dierent 
interest groups within the organisation. 
 e development plans concerned the most important needs of the work. Most of them dealt 
with co-operation (n=32, 38%), work arrangements (n=22, 26%) and machines/systems (n=12, 
14%). e quality of the development plans varied across the units. ATC unit A raised numerous 
development needs that included practical details concerning, for example, work arrangements. 
ATC units B, C and D formed more integrated development plans, in which broader problems, 
such as work organisation or the future of the unit, were raised. In addition, the level of analysis 
diered among the process groups, ATC unit D representing a more analytic way of working 
during the intervention. ATC units B and C wished that process analysis would be a continuous 
process of discussion and development between personnel and management. Rare development 
plans6 concerned a unit’s own way of acting or thinking. is result is surprising considering the 
safety critical nature of ATM, but it is not totally a new phenomenon, while non-reection and 
6 In the target ATM organisation, a follow up was carried out in 2004 so that information about the 
actions resulting from the development plans of this intervention would be available. Most of the 
development plans had revealed discussions or actions in the ATM organisation. e practical actions 
were not the scope of Study I or this thesis, and they are not considered here in more detail. 

54
 Study I raised a question of how the managers of the whole organisation recognise 
the relevance of HF issues. Study II was motivated by the ndings made in Study I (weak 
development orientation in the whole organisation), as well as by the fact, found in earlier 
studies, that managers’ understanding regarding a new way of thinking (here, HF) has a 
crucial role in successful organisational improvements. 
4.2 Managers’ conceptions regarding human factors  
in air trac management and in airport operations (Study II)
In dynamic, complex systems such as aviation, the human contribution has been recognised 
as a root factor in 80–90% of accidents and incidents (Reason, 1990; Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). is feature may be due, for example, to the increased level of technology that 
demands a high human contribution in unstable environments with restricted resources 
(Kirwan, 2001 a, b; Dekker, 2002; Hollnagel et al., 2006). Organisations still have a 
tendency to evaluate safety on a micro level when it involves individual actions, errors or 
capabilities (Dekker, 2002; Wilson-Donnelly et al., 2005; Reason, 2008, 72). Despite active 
discussion and scientic research on HF, the assumptions, paradigms and conceptions that 
inuence the way personnel and line managers in aviation organisations act and think still 
remain unclear (Hopkin, 1995; Korolija & Lundberg, 2010). e underlying assumptions, 
however, inuence the way HF is put into practice in safety critical organisations (e.g. 
Leveson, 2011). 
 e aim of Study II was to determine whether managers see HF as a safety creating 
factor and what their conceptions of HF are in regard to theoretical developments in the 
eld. e managers’ conceptions with respect to HF were studied in order to determine the 
prerequisites for the pioneer work and the starting point in the organisation (the position 
of the HF expert had been created in the organisation 1.5 years prior to this study), and 
to determine the most eective means and methods of implementing HF work within the 
organisation in order to use it in improving the safety of services. 
4.2.1 Methods
Structured interviews (n=21) were collected in 2006 from nine units with ATC and airport 
operations. e interviewees were ATC chiefs (n=11) representing middle management, 
and airport managers (n=9), representing upper management. e interviewees represented 
the following three functional environments: 1) radar units with heavy trac (A I–II), 2) 
combined civil/military units (B I–IV), and 3) procedural ATC units (C I–III).
 e interview had eight items, which were selected from the larger amount of interview 
data, and the selected items concerned the aims of the study (i.e. HF conceptions and the 
ways of dealing with HF both within the organisation and within one’s own work unit. e 
airport managers were asked to answer the interview questions from the point of view of not 
only the whole airport, but also both airport operations and ATC. 
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units had assessed the HF risks of co-operation or job contents using simulations or risk 
assessments. In addition, the reporting system had succeeded in highlighting HF. All of the 
managers had a role in the reporting system (e.g. in commenting on incident reports).
 e conceptions of the managers of the radar units with heavy trac represented the following 
categories: “uninformed”, “risk/error”, “human recovery/sociotechnical”, “organisational” or 
“complex, dynamic systems and resilience in these systems”. e managers of the combined 
civil/military units represented three dierent categories of descriptions: “risk/error”, “human 
recovery”, and “complex, dynamic systems and resilience in these systems”. Most of the managers 
working in procedural ATC units were placed into the “human recovery/sociotechnical” 
category, and some managers belonged to the “error” or “organisational” category. None of the 
managers of the procedural units ended up in the “complex, dynamic systems and resilience in 
these systems” category.
4.2.3 Discussion
In the current situation, managers’ disjointed and vague conceptions of HF can prevent the 
organisation from utilising HF competence in maintaining and developing the safety of 
services. e airport environment, as a complex, dynamic and uncertain environment, has the 
typical characteristics of complex systems (Vicente, 1999), in which, individual- or error-based 
conceptions are insucient. Reective ways of thinking and acting should be supported in 
order for work demands to be faced in the environments of ATC/airport operations (Norros, 
2004). Conceptions that represent complex, dynamic systems and resilience would be a more 
versatile background for the ATC/airport operations.
 e application of HF had supported some work units in making changes in operative 
work, which is an important commitment to a new area (Carayon, 2010). Managers 
should still have a more active role in applying HF; for example, they could train their 
subordinates in HF issues, but this activity would demand coherent training for all levels of 
the organisation’s management hierarchy rst. ere were some dierences between upper 
and middle management regarding HF conceptions. e ATC chiefs were somewhat more 
concrete and produced more material concerning HF, possibly because of their training and 
work experience specic to safety issues. If management draws attention to certain aspects, 
it directs the actions of the whole organisation (Leppänen et al., 1997; Carayon, 2010). 
 e practical signicance of the study is the identication of prerequisites that should 
be fullled before HF can become a true part of a high-reliability organisation culture and a 
key factor in the creation of safety. Firstly, a strategy and a key message from top management 
are needed, because these features commit the other manager groups of the line organisation. 
Secondly, HF is not a separate part of production but, instead, must be integrated into 
various organisation and safety management actions, such as audits, investigations, risk 
assessments and improvement procedures. Continuous training programmes for dierent 
professional groups must be developed, both for personnel and for managers. irdly, the 
work cannot be handled by one person only; instead implementation needs a team or 
network to act. Eective practical tools should be developed that are based on the latest 
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results were presented jointly to the study groups of the ATC and AFIS personnel (n=120), 
jointly to the ATC and AFIS chiefs (n=21) and to the airport managers in their own group 
(n=14). e AFIS persons were put into the same group with the ATCOs because the 
number of subjects was small (7 AFIS persons and 3 AFIS chiefs).
 Four items of the semi-structured interviews (originally with 34 items of which 12 
were used in Study II) were selected for use in Study III (e.g. “How and from what does 
an ATCO learn in his/her work?”; “What kind of training methods are used for ATCOs?”; 
“What is learning like in your unit, e.g. after an incident do you have a group discussion 
about it?”). Similar themes had been used and considered valid by researchers when they 
studied the prerequisites for a learning organisation in the Finnish paper industry in the 
1990s (Leppänen et al., 1997). e interviews were recorded. Altogether 20 interviews were 
collected in 2006. Supervisors (9 airport managers, 11 ATC chiefs) of the organisation were 
invited from nine units that were big or medium-size in the context of Finland. e units 
represented enroute, terminal and aerodrome area ATC units.
 A questionnaire using 11 items selected from the safety culture questionnaire (originally 
with 38 items) was used in the organisation in 2008 (the selected 11 items concerned 
especially learning). e basis for the questionnaire was a culture safety questionnaire that 
was formulated by Eurocontrol with the help of the University of Aberdeen (Eurocontrol, 
n.d./Mearns & Gordon). Most of the questions were reformulated by an HF expert of the 
organisation in co-ordination with a consultant, who implemented the questionnaire, to 
t the local culture. e items assessed themes of reporting and learning (“I can bring up 
my mistakes and errors”, “I get feedback on my report”, “Corrective actions are carried 
out after the reporting”, “e same mistakes keep on being repeated without any learning 
function”). e items were rated with values from 1 to 7 (1 = totally agree, 2 = somewhat 
agree, 3 = slightly agree, 4 = slightly disagree, 5 = somewhat disagree, 6 = totally disagree, 
7 = do not know). ere were originally 212 respondents from various professional groups 
from airports and units. Altogether 142 participants were chosen for this study (i.e. groups 
of ATC/AFIS personnel (n=102), ATC/AFIS chiefs and airport managers (n=40)) to keep 
the results congruent with the other data used in this study. 
4.3.2 Results
As learning opportunities and situations in ATC work, such collegial learning as sharing 
ideas and working in pairs were considered important. e practicality of the training and 
learning from everyday work was stressed. In addition, on-the-job training and following 
aviation topics in the media supported learning after the initial training. Few comments 
were given concerning learning from successes or learning in coping with dicult cases in 
co-operation with others. Self-reection was not actively mentioned by top management, 
but it was mentioned by the ATC chiefs.
 Incidents and occurrences were somewhat used as learning material in working groups 
and units, several ways of collectively sharing experiences or other ways to put lessons learned 
into action were mentioned. Still, some interviewees (6) said that sharing experienced cases 
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 New forms of work organisation include interdependency between multiple producers 
(also clients) and require negotiated “knot working” and organised network expertise across 
boundaries (Engeström, 2000; Engeström 2004; Hakkarainen et al., 2004). e aviation-
wide system has forums for sharing lessons learned, but it still raises questions about how 
aviation system level forums support learning at the national organisation level or how 
organisations learn from each other (e.g. how airlines, ANS providers and regulators share 
data and analyse it together). 
 e ndings of Study III pointed to the need for a tool that could support organisational 
learning. Tools that support learning are especially crucial in the safety critical ATM 
organisation, where there is a risk of disturbances and incidents (Vicente, 1997; Kirwan et 
al., 2001; Schorrock & Kirwan, 2002). According to the previously found results of this 
thesis, in the target ATM organisation there had existed weak development orientation 
(Study I) and managers had vague conceptions of HF (Study II). is background motivated 
Study IV.
4.4 Application of a new HF tool in an air trac management organisation 
(Study IV)
In order to improve the level of safety in a safety critical environment, a method for 
analysing incidents is essential. Traditionally, in incident analyses, the focus has been on 
factors causing problems. However, to motivate the ATC operators (here “ATC operators” 
refer both ATC personnel and managers) of the target ATM organisation in this study, 
it was considered important to highlight the positive role of human activity in coping 
with unexpected events, and the strengths and capabilities of human operators, rather than 
focusing on human errors and risks (Hollnagel, 2004; Hollnagel et al., 2006). Managers in 
particular play a crucial role in developing safety culture (Flin, 2006; Johnson et al., 2009). 
us it was considered important to aim at developing not only the personnel’s, but also 
the managers’, understanding of human risks, strengths and opportunities and, in this way, 
improve the safety culture of the organisation. e HF tool was to be used both by the ATC 
personnel and the managers (ATC operators) in the target ATM organisation to support the 
improvement of HF awareness and safety culture in the organisation. 
 Before the HF tool application, the possibilities of using previously applied HF tools 
and methods (e.g. SHEL, by Edwards, 1977; Hawkins, 1987 or HFACS based on the 
Reason model by Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) to support organisational learning were 
considered, but the application or use of these tools was found to be either too time-
consuming or they lacked the positive aspects of human behaviour. 
 Study IV aimed at reporting the application of the new, easy-to-use HF tool in the 
target ATM organisation. e active use of the tool by the ATC operators and the causal 
factors of the incidents identied by the ATC operators while using the tool were studied. 
In addition, the users’ experiences with the tool and its use were evaluated.
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using the HF tool increased each year, as did the number of reported incidents. e portion of 
HF-assessed cases decreased in the second year of use and increased in the third year. e ATC 
managers from 10 to 14 units used the tool actively each year in 2008–2010 and assessed 54% 
to 66% of the incident reports using the HF tool. Each year, moderately active users from 7 to 
10 units assessed 21% to 28% of the reports using the tool. 
 e causal factors of the incidents analysed with the HF tool were studied using data received 
from both the ATC managers and the personnel. e portion of positive causal factors assessed by 
the ATC managers increased during the time period studied (from 14% to 49% of all the causal 
factors), and the most positive assessments concerned “individual characteristics” (e.g. situational 
awareness), which was Part I of the HF tool (especially in 2010; 40% of all causal factors). e 
most frequent negative causal factors assessed by the ATC managers were “work characteristics” 
(e.g. usability of technology, automation), Part II of the tool (from 23% to 32% per year). 
 e assessments of the ATC personnel concerning the negative causal factors of the 
incidents were distributed homogeneously (from 16% to 28%) across the individual, work, 
and organisational causal factors. e ATC personnel regarded their own “individual actions” 
as negative causal factors in 21% to 28% of all of the incidents. e ATC personnel and 
managers did not consider “group causal factors” (e.g. communication, Part III of the tool) 
to be signicant causal factors of the incidents (from 6% to 13% of all causal factors). 
“Organisational factors” (e.g. co-operation between dierent actors, Part IV of the HF tool) 
were considered more as being negative (in 14% to 15% of cases) by the ATC managers and, 
similarly, also by the ATC personnel (16% to 19% of the cases). 
 According to the users’ experiences (data from the ATC managers used to study this 
research question), HF tool use activated and committed the ATC units to analyse the causal 
factors related to the HF of incidents. It helped the ATC managers to commit to and learn the 
new eld of HF.
4.4.3 Discussion
e organisation as a whole accepted the use of the new tool. However, there were dierences 
in its use annually and across the units. It is not realistic to think that all of the users would 
take a new tool into use in all situations, because adopting a new tool requires that people 
are ready to commit themselves to a new way of thinking and to a new organisational culture 
(Pfeer, 1992; Weick & Sutclie, 2001; 2003; 2007).
 e benets of the tool included its visual look, its user friendliness and the congruence 
of its contents with the earlier HF tools. e lessons learned that would support a more 
ecient use of the new tool were more extensive training, clearer instructions for the users, 
and publication of the actions based on the ndings.
 e use of HF competence in the target ATM organisation must be continued if the 
organisation is to be developed as a high-reliability organisation. e HF tool would support 
this future work. With the aid of more profound comparative methodological studies, the 
benets of the developed tool can be further improved and also implemented in other complex 
sociotechnical systems. 
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5 General discussion 
In the current thesis, the application of HF to the target ATM organisation was studied 
over a period of 10 years, and, in this process, the factors supporting and hindering the 
application of new thinking and a new tool were evaluated. HF has been regarded as a 
crucial area of competence in the creation, maintenance and improvement of safety. A 
systematic sociotechnical approach is required in order to diagnose and improve the mastery 
of HF in an organisation. 
 In this thesis, a post-strike intervention in ATM was rst executed and evaluated. e 
intervention aimed at developing and analysing ANS work using participative work process 
analysis in collaboration with dierent organisational parties. e intervention revealed the 
most important development needs of ATC work, but self-reection did not emerge. e 
intervention was evaluated positively by the participants, but its results were not actively 
applied in the organisation afterwards. is situation raised a question about the existence 
of long-term, systematic, work development orientation in the target ATM organisation, 
which was run according to strict regulation with strong technical competence (Study I). 
 e thesis proceeded to study how managers of ATM and airport operations, as key 
persons in creating organisational culture, regard HF. It was found that managers had 
disjointed conceptions of HF, and there was no strategy regarding HF on the whole or in 
the target ATM organisation. is situation could prevent the whole organisation from 
utilising HF competence in maintaining and developing the safety of services (Study II). 
 To be able to realise HF, individuals, groups and organisations must learn both at work 
and from work and also use HF facts and principles in their work. Several ways to learn 
were found, especially at the individual level and variously at the group/unit level, but these 
means were not constantly evident. In addition, potential learning material (incidents) was 
weakly utilised in the attempts to improve work and safety, and therefore it seemed as if 
no systematic learning at work existed in the target ATM organisation (Study III). Finally, 
the target ATM organisation was able to adopt a new HF tool, thus realising a new work 
activity that involved analysing HF risks and resources of the operative work (incidents). 
is activity was included in their everyday operative reporting system. Although the use of 
the tool varied from year to year and across the units, it activated and committed the ATC 
operators and managers to HF (Study IV).
5.1 Development phases of the target ATM organisation  
regarding the mastery of HF
In this thesis, the application of HF is considered an innovation, a novel set of behaviours, 
routines and ways of working that are directed at improving the ATM outcomes or user’s 
experience and that are implemented by planned and coordinated actions (Greenhalgh et al., 
2004). And the application of HF is considered a way to improve the mastery of HF in the 

66
5.2 Factors supporting HF application 
At the start of the HF application (in 2000, Study I), the target ATM organisation had a post-
strike situation and a clear need for change. Using knowledge from the behavioural sciences 
was considered a promising solution to the problems of the target ATM organisation. In 
2003, there was pressure on this organisation to improve quality and safety, and systematic 
HF work was started. e tension for change in an organisation was considered by Carayon 
(2010) to be one facilitating factor in the application of HF, and it probably helped the 
ATM target organisation to become more receptive to change, as well as more willing to 
accept or consider new ideas and suggestions.
  External experts used the approaches of complex sociotechnical systems in the investigations 
of severe incidents of the target ATM organisation in the 1990s (e.g. AIB 1993; 1997). 
External consultants were also used in the post-strike situation (Study I). Such consultants are 
considered to be change agents who can act as catalysts and facilitators of change if they are 
believed to be credible and to have good interpersonal skills (Carayon, 2010), and if they have 
enough understanding regarding the operative environment, its history, procedures, culture 
and personnel (Robbins, 1996, 720; Kirwan, 2003).
 e intervention in the target ATM organisation (Study I) succeeded in using the 
participative method to handle the work development needs, and conicts among the 
dierent professional groups were solved. According to Carayon (2010), HF application 
is more easily accepted if the participants can see clear benets in their work and if the 
constraints aecting their work are removed. Learning through and at work is also improved 
when operators assume the responsibility of analysing and developing their own work 
(Norros, 2004; Leppänen et al., 2008).
 In Studies II and III, some of the personnel and managers of the target ATM organisation 
reported that activities regarding HF or workplace learning were active in their unit or in 
the ATM organisation. e HF expert had open group discussions with the ATC operators 
during the HF training, incident investigations and other HF activities (e.g. incidents were 
used as learning material during training sessions) (Figure 5). Carayon (2010) found the 
capacity for learning and listening, exibility and good communication skills to be important 
for HF experts. ese kinds of skills have also been highlighted in “coaching”, a consultative 
form of participative leadership style that provides guidance, advice and encouragement to 
help employees improve their job performance (Robbins, 1996, 442; Kahai, Sosnik & Avolio, 
1997).
 e HF expert coached selected operators to become HF trainers in the target ATM 
organisation by transferring HF knowledge and material to this group, which became known 
as the HF network (Figure 5). Carayon (2010) has stated that the “train the trainers” model 
can be spread throughout an organisation, and, over time, it can disseminate HF knowledge 
and experience by taking on the role of an internal change agent. In addition, Robbins 
(1999, 720) has stated that, as change agents, internal sta specialists can support the desired 
change in employee attitudes, skills, experiences and perceptions within organisations.
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organisation or in the whole organisation (FCAA, Finavia) although there was a clear need 
for it (e.g. AIB 1993; 1997; ANS audit, 1998). e international regulatory bodies oered 
information regarding the relevance of HF in improving safety already 20 years prior to 
the start of the HF expertise in the target ATM organisation (e.g. ICAO, 1989). Scientic 
ndings had oered information about mastering the demands continuously faced in such 
high reliability operative work since the 1970s (e.g. Vicente & Rasmussen, 1995). And 
already in the 1980s, the exploitation of information technologies and the resulting increase 
in automation in transportation systems had created a need to understand and support 
human operators’ work activities in these highly demanding contexts (Norros, 2004).
 e historical development of the whole organisation, as well as ATM as a part of the 
whole organisation, is described in the Introduction. e Finnish aviation administration 
and the target ATM organisation, as a part of it, have been a regulated monopoly without 
serious competitors, and it has a history of being a fragmented organisation (Hakola, 1997). 
Its production and functions have remained stable, for the most part, for decades (Hakola, 
1997; 2007), and this situation may weaken the exibility of the organisation with respect to 
changes in general (Robbins, 1996, 715). e whole organisation (FCAA, the state enterprise) 
was separated from the regulatory side reasonably late, in 2006. Besides, aviation history has 
gone hand in hand with the developments made in the military industry, especially wars 
have improved the infrastructure and technology used in aviation (e.g. Koonce, 1999). ATM 
development has been based on trac volume and technological innovations (Hakola, 1997). 
In order to be successfully adopted, HF should be compatible with the adopter’s values and 
norms (Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Carayon, 2010), and it is also known that an organisation’s 
culture is formed and facilitated by its history and management (Schein, 1992). In the case 
of the ATM organisation discussed in this thesis, the history and culture have supported the 
creation of competence in elds other than the knowledge of human behaviour. 
 ere was no strategy for HF or unied concepts regarding HF in the target ATM 
organisation (Study II), and managers of the organisation had not yet been systematically 
trained for HF (Studies II, IV). In the target ATM organisation, safety responsibilities had 
been dened in the safety management manual of the organisation since 2006. However, 
there was still some need to clarify the roles, and the manual did not include all of the 
HF actions implemented in the target ATM organisation. According to Carayon (2010), 
strategic barriers (e.g. unclear responsibility for safety across an organisation) can hinder HF 
application in organisations. It is known that strong leadership, a strategic and commonly 
shared vision and a climate conducive to experimentation are characteristics of organisations 
that are receptive to change and learning (Arvidsson et al., 2006; Leppänen et al., 2008; 
Carayon, 2010). 
 e results of this thesis point to the strong subcultures in the whole organisation, 
as also noted by the external consultants (Study I; also Hanski, 2002; Palukka, 2003). 
Dierent sections of the whole organisation (e.g. ANS, airport operations, techniques) had 
dierent historical roots, and the personnel had varying professional experience, education 
and training demands (Study II). e ANS functioning as an independent department was 
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the building of relationships between HF experts and operative organisations and policy 
makers. ese were provided by several international regulatory and advisory bodies (e.g. 
Eurocontrol, 2008), but the resources of the small target ATM organisation were too limited 
for active participation in any but a few of the programmes. 
 In the target ATM organisation, changes in the organisational structure or work 
organisation were not made due to or concerning the new roles (HRD, HF), and, therefore, 
HF work was primarily carried out by itself for the rst 5–6 years (Figure 5). If improvements 
are made only at the department or unit level, HF application can be hindered, when 
compared with situations in which improvements are made at the system level, so that 
structural patterns are formed in the organisation (Carayon, 2010). 
 ere were signals indicating that, at the start of the HF application, there was no clear 
documentation or other preparation activities in the organisation prior to the HRD or HR 
vacancies (Study II). Carayon (2010) has stated that signicant preparation and planning 
has to take place in an organisation in order for it to be ready for HF.
 ere also remains the question of whether the HF tool (introduced in Study IV) that was 
put into practice in the nal phase of the overall HF application process in the target ATM 
organisation was adopted as a real tool that created new activity in the target ATM organisation 
or whether it was regarded as a new rule or norm (e.g. Engeström, 1987) set by the target ATM 
organisation – already and traditionally driven by norms and aviation regulation. 
 
5.4 HF as a necessary tool for the target ATM organisation 
e HF application in the target ATM organisation, introduced in this thesis, oered a 
good example of best practices for the way a small country with limited resources fulls 
international (often strict) safety norms and regulations.
 In the target ATM, and in the whole organisation, HF application was mainly included 
as a part of the SMS, which was an organised approach to managing safety, including the 
necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures (ICAO, 2009). 
e ANS providers are responsible for establishing an SMS, but also for regularly updating 
the included manuals, procedures and guidelines (existing regulations e.g. Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2096/2005). Without HF knowledge and expertise (“safety thinking”), 
in addition to the traditional SMS, however, safety improvements may remain at the 
bureaucratic and ocial level, without any reform of workplace practices. 
 To advance safety, aviation organisations need to move beyond regulatory compliance; 
rulemaking has started to meet its limit of eectiveness (Dijkstra, 2006; Learmount, 2008). 
HF interventions oer possibilities for organisation members to explain, oer reasons for, 
or argue about the information behind the given safety norms, regulations or procedures 
(e.g. ICAO, 2009). is thesis indicates that, over a period of 10 years, the target ATM 
organisation started to become aware of the necessity of HF knowledge and began to realise 
that safety improvements demand HF competence. 
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organisation, she had to be careful not to base her estimate too much on any single partner 
of the organisation (e.g. administration, management or controllers). Instead, she tried to 
create an objective way to work and assess the organisation with the help of theoretically 
driven and empirically tested tools and work methods, such as the work process analysis 
used in Study I.
 e author’s dual role was also a strength of the thesis. e ATM organisation studied 
in this thesis is not easily accessed by a researcher outside its circle. As an inner organisation 
member, the author was able to form condential relations with the operative personnel, as 
well as with the middle and top management, and these relations made the data collection 
for this thesis possible. is would have not been the case for an outsider. is lack of trust 
could also be one explanation for the lack of proactive change within the whole organisation 
– outside experts have not been very sensitively accepted. Due to the dual role of the 
author, she was able to implement participative intervention (a form of action research) 
as her methodological approach. As a result, the situation of the target ATM organisation 
improved, while, at the same time, it was being evaluated and researched. In addition, the 
dataset of this thesis can be considered skewed; however, it also represents several kinds of 
methods and types of data.
 What should have been done dierently in the HF application process? From hindsight, 
it is easy to note that the HF application would have been more successful if the resources 
of the HF work had been greater; in this process, teamwork and a network that co-operated 
on HF issues were formed reasonably late. In addition, there should have been more active 
contact with top management from the beginning. Such contact was not considered possible 
at the beginning, however. A stronger role for the supervisors (ATC chiefs/managers and 
supervisors) would have helped activate the HF application. Furthermore, the role of 
technology and the usability of automation was increased (Studies I, IV), and this problem 
could have been tackled with the models and tools of cognitive ergonomics – but, however, 
this approach would have been impossible to cope with within the scope of this thesis. is 
area should be handled more deeply in the future.
5.6 How to proceed in the future
e HF application in the target ATM organisation, introduced in this thesis, was a down-to-
top approach to work and organisation development, which started with practical actions or 
interventions with personnel. In the future, the scope of the HF application should focus on 
actions of middle and top management, as well as on the system approach with several actors. 
 If the HF application is to proceed, the level of HF competence in the whole 
organisation (Finavia Corporation) should be evaluated objectively. HF competence means 
knowledge of, for example, human performance, equipment, systems, work environments 
and organisational behaviour in order to support safe, comfortable, and eective human 
performance. e knowledge required to design, implement and disseminate HF actions 
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be created with other safety critical, high reliability organisations (nuclear power, maritime, 
energy industry, health care), in order to benchmark safety critical processes and procedures 
of safety management, but also with universities and institutes in order to obtain knowledge 
of the latest ndings and solutions concerning safety improvements. is orientation 
demands that the whole organisation recognise the characteristics found during the process 
of this thesis (Studies I, III), namely, complacency, a lack of self-reection, “unlearnedness” 
and some introversion was found in the target ATM organisation, although the situation 
improved later (Study IV). 
 Without comprehension concerning the need for HF work also in the future, no 
persistence (“stamina”) will emerge to make long-term activities in continuing HF possible 
in the organisation – and the HF application will continue to be only short-run adaptive 
learning (“doing better at what we are already doing”; Schein, 1996). Long-term HF activities 
demand a strategy regarding the implementation of HF in the organisation (a proposal with 
several stages in Study II; an example of a HF policy by FAA, 2005; prerequisites stated by 
Carayon, 2010). Without this, the activities will be “handicraft at the individual level”, with 
several risks and hindrances, partly presented also in this thesis. 
 e process of designing the kind of a long-term strategy that is needed, and implementing 
eective interventions based on that strategy, has better possibilities to succeed if the work and 
ndings of this thesis are rst contemplated and discussed – and the ndings are compared with 
the situation before this 10-year process began. Continuing the learning process (described in 
this thesis) is needed because it is the only way to proceed in mastering the demands of the 
future global ATM, which is becoming more complicated, dynamic and uncertain because of 
economic, political and social changes in the functional environment, which is also aecting 
small countries such as Finland (e.g. Dijkstra, 2006; Ek et al., 2007).
 To summarise, the key message for the target ATM organisation (and the whole 
organisation), according to this thesis, is that, for the target ATM organisation, it is nice 
to have continuing HF awareness and training for dierent professional groups, but there 
should be active HF interventions managed by middle and top management – and, in 
order to get full value out of the former activities, there must be a HF strategy that will 
support future work in HF application so that the HF aspect is a solid part of the overall 
development activities of the whole organisation, and the results of the HF strategy are 
available and recognised in everyday operative work.
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